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KIDNAPPING FEDERALISM:
UNITED STATES v. WILLS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXTENDING
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW INTO THE
STATES
M. TODD SCOTT*
On March 1, 1932, Charles and Anne Lindberg's twenty-month-
old baby boy was kidnapped out of his nursery while he slept.'
Known for many years after as the "crime of the century," the
kidnapping of the Lindberg baby was, at the time, highly
sensationalized.2 Not only did it involve Lindberg, the man who had
flown solo across the Atlantic to become the age's "greatest hero,"
but the ransom demanded-fifty thousand Depression-era dollars-
was considered by most Americans at the time to be a fortune.'
Newspapers of the day covered the kidnapping with an intensity
usually reserved for politics or war, and ordinary people deluged the
Lindberg family with thousands of potential leads, expressions of
sympathy, and psychic predictions.4 Even the notorious gangster Al
Capone got involved; he promised that if he were released from
prison, he and his henchman would deliver both the missing child and
the perpetrator.
Despite the level of attention swirling around the missing
Lindberg baby, authorities investigating the kidnapping found
themselves hampered in their efforts by the nature of kidnapping
J.D. Northwestern, 2003. Special thanks to Professor Steven Calabresi for putting me
on the right track.
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laws.6 At the time, the only kidnapping laws were state laws, and
these often-conflicting state laws forced the authorities to conform
an otherwise national manhunt to the particular idiosyncrasies of each
state into which it extended.7  To alleviate this confusion and
facilitate the pursuit of kidnappers without regard to state lines,
Congress quickly passed the Federal Kidnapping Act.8 Designed
exclusively to give federal authorities the power to chase kidnappers
when they fled from one jurisdiction to another and from one state to
another, the Act created a legal supplement to state kidnapping laws:
a nationwide rule of illegality that could govern where a single state's
law could not.9
Unfortunately, the Act could do little to help the missing
Lindberg child. As a trucker discovered on May 12, 1932, the body
of the baby had all the while been laying in the woods just a few
miles from the Lindberg home, dead as the result of a skull fracture.1"
The Act had been irrelevant; the victim had not been carried across a
county line, much less a state line.1"
Nevertheless, the Act remained, and for the next fifty years it
was employed with little controversy, used against those kidnappers
that, during the course of the kidnapping, carried their victims across
state lines. 2 Over the years, the Act performed the function for
which it was designed: to give federal authorities the ability to chase
kidnappers across jurisdictional lines and prosecute them under a
single, federal criminal statute without becoming tangled in the mire
of inconsistent state laws.1
3
Recently, however, in United States v. Wills, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expanded the Act's traditional scope to
reach kidnappings in which the kidnapper does not carry his victim
6 See United States v. Chatwin, 326 U.S. 455, 463 (1946); H. R. REP. 72-1493, at I
(1932); 75 CONG. REC. 5,075-76, 13,282-304 (1932).
7 See Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 463; H.R. REP. No. 72-1493; 75 CONG. REc. 5075-76.
8 See Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 462-63. See also Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201
(1932).
9 Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 462-63.
1o See HUNTERDON COUNTY DEMOCRAT, supra note 1.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Hughes, 716
F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550 (1 lth
Cir. 1979); United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
McBryar, 553 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1974).
'3 See Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 463.
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across state lines. 4 In Wills, the court held that federal jurisdiction
arises under the Act when a kidnapper uses false pretenses to lure his
victim into crossing state lines, even if the kidnapper himself does not
accompany the victim during that crossing. 5 As the Wills court
noted, its holding was in direct opposition to United States v.
McInnis, a twenty-year-old case from the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit that held that federal jurisdiction under the Act can be
established only when the kidnapper actually accompanies the victim
across state lines. 6 The Act, the Fifth Circuit held in Mclnnis, does
not "reach the entirely voluntary act of a victim in crossing a state
line even though it is induced by deception."'
' 7
As this article will argue, the circuit split resulting from Wills is
of some consequence. For if, as Wills holds, federal jurisdiction
under the Act can attach even when a kidnapping does not cross state
lines, then the constitutionality of the Act is brought into question.
The Act, like all federal criminal laws, is constitutionally justified by
Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, which
grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 8 If it can
be applied to intrastate activities, as the Wills decision would have it,
under what part of the Constitution could the Act be said to
originate? 9 Likewise, if the Act can be used to allow federal
authorities to prosecute a kidnapper who does not carry his victim
across state lines, important questions of federalism arise: Which
entity-the federal government or the state-is charged with policing
the protection of citizens? What powers, if any, do the states still
retain if the federal government is free to police crimes within their
borders?2" Finally, in the aftermath of Wills, how are courts to deal
with the Act's declared legislative purpose and heretofore cohesive
body of precedent, both of which Wills would seem to contradict?'
This article proposes that, in its split with existing law set forth
by the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Wills
misread the Federal Kidnapping Act to reach a conclusion that 1)
unconstitutionally enabled federal jurisdiction by allowing a federal
14 234 F. 3d 174 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 911 (2001).
"5 Id. at 178.
16 Id. See also Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1324-27.
17 Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1327.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
'9 See infra Part II.A. 1.
20 See infra Part Ul.B.
21 See infra Part III.
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criminal law to be utilized against a wholly intrastate crime; 2)
violated the tenets of federalism by granting federal authorities power
over an area traditionally reserved to the states; and 3) contradicted
both precedent and the legislative purpose of the Act by extending
the law to a crime-intrastate kidnapping-that it has never been
understood to cover.
To make this argument, the first section of this article will
provide a brief history of the Act and will detail the contradictory
holdings of McInnis and Wills. The second section will discuss the
constitutionality of the Wills decision by first reviewing the history of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to pass federal
criminal laws such as the Act. Next, it will examine the curtailment
of Congress' commerce power in United States v. Lopez22 , and
describe the federalist interests of the current Supreme Court. Lastly,
the second section of this article will show how a federalist
jurisprudence grounded in Lopez was successfully employed by the
Court in United States v. Jones,23 a case nearly identical to Wills that
could have implicated many of the same constitutional concerns.
The third section of this article will turn specifically to Wills,
detailing the manner in which the Fourth Circuit's decision
contradicted the legislative purpose of the Act, the internal logic of
the federal criminal regime, and the precedent under the Act. The
third section will also detail the highly unnatural "natural reading" of
the Act employed by the Fourth Circuit to reach such an isolated
decision.
Finally, the fourth section of this article will look to the possible
future effect of the Wills decision, most notably to a similar case
likely headed to court as a result of Wills' expansion of federal
jurisdiction under the Act.
I. THE FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT: FROM INCEPTION TO WILLS
A. PURPOSEFUL BEGINNINGS
Originally enacted in 1932 as a response to the kidnapping of the
Lindberg baby, the Federal Kidnapping Act24 was designed to assist
22 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
23 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
24 In pertinent part, the statute states: "Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles,
decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or caries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any
person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when -(I) the person is willfully
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive
[Vol. 93
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state governments in quashing the then "epidemic" of organized
kidnapping syndicates.2 5 The point of the Act, simply, was to enable
federal authorities to chase kidnappers when they fled from one
jurisdiction to another. 26  To achieve this end, Congress used
"comprehensive language" in the Act to cover "every possible variety
of kidnapping followed by interstate transportation," thereby giving
federal authorities broad power to "disregard borders" and prosecute
interstate kidnappings that individual states' laws could no longer
reach.27
Though the Act's "comprehensive language" helped produce an
early body of caselaw consistent with the proclaimed purpose of the
Act,28 a 1972 amendment to the Act served to confuse some of this
consistency.29 In short, the amendment opened the possibility that the
Act no longer required the kidnapper to physically "accompany" the
victim across state lines in order for federal jurisdiction to attach.3°
Though the cases that were decided after the amendment continued to
further pre-amendment precedent on this point,31 the question of
whether such interstate accompaniment was absolutely necessary
under the Act remained unanswered until the Fifth Circuit decided
Mclnnis.
B. IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING MADE EXPLICIT: UNITED STATES V.
MCINNIS
In Mclnnis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
became the first court to explicitly hold that for jurisdiction to attach
under the Federal Kidnapping Act, a kidnapper must physically
accompany his victim across state lines.32 The Fifth Circuit found in
when transported across a state boundary if the person was alive when the transportation
began... shall be punished..." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2001).
25 Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 463 (citing H. R. REP. No. 72-1493 (1932)).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., id. at 462-65; see also Edison v. United States, 272 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir.
1959) (holding that Act requires that a defendant "cros[s] state line[s] with the kidnapped
victim in his custody").
29 See infra note 38.
30 id.
31 See, e.g., United States v. McBryar, 553 F.2d 433, 433 (5th Cir. 1977) (requiring
accompanied kidnapping to continue until after state lines have been crossed for federal
jurisdiction to attach); United States v. Hoog, 504 F. 2d 45, 50-51 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding
that Act prohibits the decoying or inveighing of a victim into accompanying the defendant
across state lines).
32 United States v. Mctnnis, 601 F. 2d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir. 1979).
2003]
M. TODD SCOTT [Vol. 93
Mclnnis that federal jurisdiction did not exist, for though the
defendants in that case planned to have their victim travel from Texas
to Mexico-where he would be kidnapped and murdered-their plan
involved the victim traveling on his own accord.3 Jurisdiction under
the Act, the court held, could not be extended to reach such a
situation, to "reach the entirely voluntary act of a victim in crossing a
state line even though it is induced by deception."34
The McInnis court supported its conclusion with reference to the
legislative purpose of the Act,35 to the jurisdictional requirements of
other federal criminal statutes predicated on interstate commerce,36
and to the absence of cases "in which causation has been imputed
because the victim transported himself., 37  Additionally, the court
noted, though the 1972 amendment to the Act served to "make the
thrust of the offense the kidnapping itself rather than the interstate
transporting of the kidnapped person,, 38 the legislative history of the
amendment-as well as the text of the revised amendment itself-in
no way indicated that the jurisdictional element of transportation had
been removed or diminished.39  As a result, the court held, the
kidnapping statute could not "be stretched to enable the government
to prosecute a defendant merely because what he [does] is vile, or...
a violation of state law that is likely to go unpunished by state
31 Id. at 1321.
14 Id. at 1327.
35 The court acknowledged that the purpose of the Act was "to outlaw interstate
kidnapping rather than general transgressions of morality involving the crossing of state
lines." Id. at 1324 (quoting United States v. Chatwin, 326 U.S. 433, 463 (1946)).
36 See, e.g., The National Stolen Property Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 806 (1948) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 ) (under which "no case has been cited in which causation has
been imputed because the victim transported himself'); cited in McInnis, 601 F.2d at 1326
("The kidnapping statute thus fits into a common statutory model for federal offenses that
premise federal jurisdiction on the offender's unlawful exercise of control over a person or
object followed by the interstate transportation of that person or object.").
37 United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir.).
38 The text of the statute as originally passed in 1932 created liability for any person who
"knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been
unlawfully seized, confined .. " Federal Kidnapping Act, Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326
(1932) (emphasis added). The amended (current) statute creates liability for "whoever
unlawfully seizes, confines.., any person ... when- (1) the person is willfully transported
in interstate or foreign commerce .. ". 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 2001). In sum, the
previous iteration of the statute explicitly required the "kidnapping" to precede the state line
crossing.
'9 McInnis, 601 F.2d at 1324-25 (citing S. REP. No. 92-1105, pt. 2, at 1 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4316.)
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authorities."4
C. DENYING THE PAST, CREATING THE SPLIT: UNITED STATES V. WILLS
Twenty-eight years later, in Wills, the Fourth Circuit reached the
exact opposite conclusion of McInnis by holding that
"unaccompanied travel over state lines is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction."41
In Wills, a Virginia resident named Zabiuflah Alam came home
to discover Christopher Wills burglarizing his apartment.42 Wills was
arrested and indicted, but before a grand jury could be convened,
Wills anonymously lured Alam to the District of Colombia through
the guise of a bogus job offer.43 Though his car was later found in
Maryland, Alam was never seen again.44
Wills escaped prosecution for the burglary charge, but was later
prosecuted under the Federal Kidnapping Act on the theory that he
had dispatched Alam to prevent him from testifying in the burglary
case.45 Taped phone conversations between Wills and his brother, an
inmate in a Virginia state prison, supported this conclusion; in the
conversations, Wills had not only indicated that he was "getting
ready to hurt [Alam]," but also later told his brother that "his business
was 'tak[en] care of"' 46
Despite these statements, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction.47
According to the district court, the Act required that a victim be
"willfully transported" by another across state lines for federal
jurisdiction to attach.48 This requirement, the court held, was
illuminated not only by Mclnnis and other precedent,49 but also by the
40 Id. at 1327.
41 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000).
42 Id. at 175.
43 Id. As part of his lure, Wills obtained a cell phone under a phony name. On a flier
that he left outside Alam's apartment, Wills listed the cell's number as that of a fictional
company seeking new employees. Alam called this number and arranged a job interview in
the District of Columbia. Id. at 176.
44 Id. at 176.
45 United States v. Wills, 2000 WL 311188, at *1 (E.D.Va. Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Wills 1].
46 Wills, 234 F.3d at 176.
47 Wills I, 2000 WL 311188, at *6.
48 Id. at *4.
" Id. at *2-*6, (citing United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that subject matter jurisdiction attaches only with an interstate transporting of a
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statute's legislative history.5" Because Wills did not satisfy this
requirement, but "at most.., caused [Alam] to travel in interstate
commerce" of his own accord, the court held that federal jurisdiction
could not attach and dismissed the case.51
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed, convicting Wills on a
theory that deception alone, without accompaniment across state
lines, was sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under the Act.52
According to the court, both Mclnnis and the logic of the lower court
were irrelevant in the face of clear congressional intent, intent that
could be realized in the plain text of the statute.53 Because the text of
the statute required only that the victim "[be] willfully transported," it
therefore did "not require that the defendant accompany, physically
transport, or provide for the physical transportation of the victim."54
To satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Act, then, the court held
that it only need ask if the "kidnapper ha[d] interfered with, and
exercised control over, [the victim's] actions."5 In Wills, the court
found, Alam's freedom to abandon his trip at any time was of little
consequence, for the actions taken by Wills to lure him to the District
of Colombia "supported a finding that Alam was 'willfully
transported' within the meaning of the statute," and therefore federal
jurisdiction could sufficiently attach.56
D. THE AFTERMATH OF WILLS
The circuit split Wills creates is significant for a number of
kidnapped person); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that Congress' power to prohibit criminal acts is borne out of Commerce Clause); United
States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that Act not violated when victim
voluntarily crosses state lines); United States v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that jurisdiction attaches despite victim's willingness to accompany kidnapper
provided kidnapped maintains "force in reserve")).
50 United States v. Wills, 2000 WL 311188, *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2000) (citing United
States v. Chatwin, 326 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1946) (holding that statute does not apply to
"situations lacking the involuntariness of seizure and detention which is the very essence of
the crime of kidnapping")). See supra Part I.A.
", Id. at *6.
52 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000).
" Id. The court in Wills acknowledged but did not argue with the holding of Mclnnis.
Instead the court chose only to "respectfully disagree" with the conclusion reached therein.
Id.
54 Id. at 176 (stating that after the 1972 amendment to the Act, interstate travel is "merely
a basis for federal jurisdiction rather than an integral party of the substantive crime").




reasons, the least of which is the effect it will have on defendants
who lure, invite, or otherwise induce their victims to cross state lines
before kidnapping them. After Wills, previously "intrastate"
defendants in the Fourth Circuit must now face "interstate" criminal
charges, federal criminal charges that will enable attorneys general to
pursue defendants that would otherwise be beyond their reach.57
Likewise, state kidnapping defendants may now be plucked up by
federal prosecutors and forced to stand before a federal criminal
court, with its stricter and often more lengthy sentencing
requirements,58 despite not having "transported" or otherwise carried
their victim in interstate commerce. 59
More significantly, the split between Mclnnis and Wills and their
conflicting views of Congress' legislative power speaks to the scope
of the Constitution itself. Under Mclnnis, which holds that Congress
intended for jurisdiction under the Act to attach only when the
kidnapper accompanies his victim across state lines, the Act would
seem to be well within Congress' traditional power to legislate under
the Commerce Clause.6" But if, as Wills holds, the intent of Congress
was to create federal jurisdiction over kidnappings where the
kidnapper does not himself accompany or otherwise maintain control
over the victim while crossing state lines, then not only has Congress'
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause been stretched to a
new and possibly unconstitutional limit, but, as this comment will
explain, the restraints of federalism have been cast aside, as well.61
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
This section will discuss the constitutional implications of the
57 See, e.g., infra Part V.
58 RICHARD H. MCLEESE, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION § 1.11 (1997) (noting that federal sentencing guidelines and procedural
standards create substantial discrepancies between parallel cases tried in state versus federal
court).
59 Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the
Alarm or "Crying Wolf? ", 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1317, 1341 (2000) ("[N]ew federal crimes
dealing with local conduct place additional (and essentially unreviewable) power in the
hands of federal prosecutors, prompting questions about diverse treatment, sentences, and
other issues related to the basis for selecting one defendant for federal prosecution while
others are prosecuted by the state. In the absence of a distinct federal interest, the decision to
prosecute can lack a guiding federal principle."). See also TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION
OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., REPORT ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW 33 (1998).
60 See infra Part II.A.
61 See infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
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Wills decision. To do so, it will first cover a brief history of
Congress' power to create criminal laws under the Commerce Clause.
Next, it will discuss Lopez62 and the current Court's federalist view of
the Commerce Clause. Finally, it will examine Jones,63 a most recent
case that is both analogous to Wills and illustrative of the Court's
current procedure for reviewing the constitutionality of a federal
criminal law.
A. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Unlike state governments, which have a broad "police power" to
criminalize conduct, the federal government has inherent power "to
regulate its internal affairs for the protection or promotion of public
health, safety, and morals, or-somewhat more vaguely-for the
protection or promotion of the public welfare."'  To act on this
inherent power, however, Congress has always been required to
locate a constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction under which it can
act.6"
Traditionally, these bases for jurisdiction have sprung out of the
occurrence of a crime on federal lands or property,66 the commission
of a crime on or by a federal employee,67 the use of the mails,68 or the
involvement of interstate commerce.6 ' The last of these jurisdictional
bases, interstate commerce, has been most commonly employed by
Congress, and has been further sub-divided into the following three
distinct types of jurisdictional foundations: those involving the
interstate transportation of the victim,70 proceeds,7' or offender;72
62 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
63 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
64 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 128 (2d. ed. 1986).
65 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limitsfor Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 979, 980 (1995).
66 Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution gives the federal government jurisdiction "over
federal enclaves-those islands of federal owned and controlled lands that are within the
state (e.g., military posts, federal courthouses, post offices, and national parks)." McLEESE,
supra note 58, at § 1.7.
67 See generally MCLEESE, supra note 58, at § 1.8.
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1948) (codifying the Post Office Act).
69 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
70 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (West 2001) (criminalizing kidnapping).
71 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1948) (criminalizing interstate transport of stolen goods).
72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1968) (criminalizing interstate transport of one involved in
a riot). See generally McLEESE, supra note 58, at § 1.10.
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those prohibiting "the use of a medium of interstate commerce in the
commission of an offense";73 and those involving interstate crimes
that "affect" commerce. 4 Although this discussion of the Act is
concerned with the first foundation-"interstate transport of the
victim"-a brief history of all three and how they came to be
subdivided will greatly illuminate the issues at hand.
1. Expanding the Commerce Power Before Lopez v. United States
Any history of federal criminal law must begin with the
Constitution's Commerce Clause, the clause which delegates to
Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the several
states.75 In the seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden,76 the Supreme
Court recognized that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the
power to regulate not only commerce, "but also those activities
necessary to commerce. 7  Under this rubric, it became clear that to
protect "those activities necessary to commerce," Congress had the
power to regulate crime. 8
After the Civil War, Congress began to use its criminal law-
making authority under the Commerce Clause, "employ[ing] federal
sanctions to protect private individuals from invasion of their rights
by other private individuals. ' 79 Traditionally, the authority to enforce
such "police" protection had been a function of state law.8" But
during the Reconstruction, Congress found such authority useful for
protecting civil rights when many of the states otherwise refused to
do so.8" Later, Congress similarly used its developing federal police
power to fill other gaps in local laws, as with the Interstate
73 McLEESE, supra note 58, at §1.10.
74 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970) (codifying the Hobbes Act, which prohibited
robbery or extortion that obstructs, delays, or affects commerce). See generally McLEESE,
supra note 58, at §1.10.
75 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
76 22 U.S. I (1824).
77 Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal
Criminal Law, 31 COLUMBIA J. OF LAW AND SOC. PROB. 61 (1997).
78 See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the hnpact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 40 (1996). See generally, Kathleen F. Brickey,
Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTING L.J. 1135,
1139 (1995).
79 Louis B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 65 (1948).
80 Id.
81 Maroney, supra note 59, at 1320-21.
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Commerce Commission Act, enacted in 1887, and the Sherman
Antitrust Act, enacted in 1890.82 In each instance, the public support
for criminal enforcement enabled Congress to act on its commerce
power without contest; nevertheless, Congress' expanding reach
under the commerce clause remained "controversial because it
extended into areas previously the exclusive province of state law."83
In the twentieth century, as Congress began to push the limits of
its commerce power with vigor, the number of federal criminal laws
began to swell at a rate like never before.8 4 For example, in 1910,
Congress passed the Mann Act,85 in 1919 it passed the Dyer Act,86 in
1932, the Kidnapping Act,87 and in 1934 the Bank Robbery Act.88 As
it had earlier, Congress designed each of these laws to federalize
what was essentially a state law crime that happened to be beyond the
reach of state law.89 In order to successfully enact these criminal
laws, though, Congress was forced to adhere to the strict limit that the
Court had imposed on its commerce power; for each new law,
Congress was allowed only to regulate an activity that "directly"
affected interstate commerce. 90
With the New Deal, President Roosevelt and Congress began to
test the Court's standard, enacting laws that stretched previous
boundaries of the commerce power to their limits.91 Famously, in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel,92 the Court joined the President and
Congress by dropping the "direct effects" test for a "close and
82 Id. at 1322.
83 Id.
84 See Brickey, supra note 78, at 1135 (the "federalization of American criminal law is a
Twentieth Century phenomenon").
8" 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948) (prohibiting the interstate transport of women for immoral
purposes).
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1948) (prohibiting the interstate transport of stolen vehicles).
87 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948).
88 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1948).
89 See Maroney, supra note 59, at 1324. These crimes were beyond the reach of state
law in the sense that, when a kidnapper, for example, left the state where the crime had been
committed, he also left behind the jurisdiction in which he could be prosecuted.
Federalization of the crime enabled jurisdiction to cross state lines along with the criminal.
90 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
91 Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges after United States v.
Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REv. 867, 873 (1998). When enacting such laws as the 1934 Anti-
Racketeering Act and the 1934 Bank Robbery Act, Congress was "fully conscious that it was
extending federal law to matters previously left to the states." Maroney, supra note 59, at
1325 (quoting Beale, supra note 78, at 42).
92 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
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substantial relation to interstate commerce" test.93 This newly
expanded test enabled Congress to regulate even wholly intrastate
activities provided they had at least a "close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce. 94 In Wickard v. Filburn95 , the Court further
loosened the reins by requiring only that the "aggregate effects" of
local actions, when taken together, have some effect on interstate
commerce.96 Under this rationale, the Court allowed Congress to
regulate farmers growing food exclusively for their own
consumption,97 thereby setting the standard for what would be fifty
years of near-total freedom for Congress to legislate under the
Commerce Clause.98 Congress would use this freedom under the
Commerce Clause "not only to implement wide-ranging social and
economic legislation[,] but also to enact significant criminal
provisions, greatly increasing the reach of federal criminal
authority."99 As one author of the late 1990s noted, this increasing
"reach of federal criminal authority" would eventually result in a full
"40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War"
being enacted after 1970.00
2. Defining the Limit of the Commerce Power in United States v. Lopez
Congress' near total freedom to federalize under Wickard was
ultimately curtailed in 1995, however, when the Supreme Court
decided Lopez.'' In Lopez, the Court again acknowledged that
Congress could regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that
"substantially affect interstate commerce."'02 Notably, though, the
93 Id.
94 Id.
9' 317 U.S. 111, 125-28 (1942).
96 Id.
97 The Court held that, even though the food was being grown instead of purchased, in
the aggregate the production would have some effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 125.
98 Under the Wickard rationale, "even legislation enacted primarily to prohibit...
'trivial' intrastate activity is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, provided the aggregate
effect on interstate commerce is substantial." James M. Maloney, Shooting for an
Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms
Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1795, 1811 (1994).
99 St. Laurent, supra note 77, at 71.
100 Maroney, supra note 59, at 1327 (quoting TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR Assoc., supra note 59, at 7).
'0' 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
02 Id. at 558-59.
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Court went on to find that the legislation in question-the Federal
Gun-Free School Zone Act' 3-did not satisfy any of these tests, for
the crime it sought to prevent-bringing guns near school-did not
involve channels of interstate commerce,0 4  did not involve
instrumentalities of interstate commerce," 5 and did not substantially
affect interstate commerce. 10 6 The Court therefore struck down the
Act and recognized a limit to the commerce power for the first time
since its expansion had begun in 1937.107 To not have done so, the
Court reasoned, would have been to "convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."'
0 8
The response to Lopez was overwhelming. Some praised it as a
return to a pre-New Deal balance of power between Congress and the
states; others decried it as the worst type of judicial activism.0 9 Few,
however, could ignore the possible implications of a case that not
only redefined the limits of congressional power, but also reanimated
the notion that the states-not the federal government-were
preeminently charged with the protection of their citizens."0 As the
Court continued to pursue this Lopez agenda through a string of
succeeding cases and continued to test the constitutional limits of
Congress' ability to federalize criminal laws, the critical and judicial
attention to its "new" view of the Commerce Clause likewise
continued to intensify."' Despite this attention, consensus about the
103 18 U.S.C. § 922 (regulating the possession of weapons within "gun-free zones"
surrounding public schools).
104 Channels of interstate commerce include highways and airways. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
105 Instrumentalities of interstate commerce include "persons or things" needed to carry
out interstate travel. Id.
106 For gun possession near schools to affect interstate commerce, the court held, there
would have to be a "jurisdictional nexus" between gun possession near schools and interstate
commerce. Id. See also Kathryn Jermann, Project Exile and the Overfederalization of
Crime, 10 KAN. J.L. PuB. POL'Y 332, 336 (2000).
107 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,37 (1937).
'o' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
109 See generally Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of U.S. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995); Glenn H. Reynolds &
Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme Court Held a
Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 369, 369-70 (2000); Louis
J. Virelli and David S. Leibowitz, Federalism Whether They Want It or Not. The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and The Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After U.S. v.
Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926 (2001).
110 See supra Part II.A.
111 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997) (finding Brady Act's
[ ol. 93
KIDNAPPING FEDERALISM
effects of Lopez remained elusive,1 2 and big questions continued to
loom: How would the Court's new agenda affect the future of federal
law, particularly the future of federal criminal law? How could fifty
years of federal criminal law be reconciled with the Lopez Court's
vision of a Constitution that requires a "distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local"?..3
B. FEDERALIZATION AND FEDERALISM
1. After Lopez: Focusing the Federalism Lens on Criminal Law
These questions were finally best answered by those viewing
Lopez through the lens of federalism." 4 As an act of federalism,
Lopez works to curtail congressional criminal authority in an effort to
maintain the power reserved for the states by the Tenth
Amendment." 5 As Lopez explained, because the Tenth Amendment
sets forth "a federal government of limited, enumerated powers[,]...
commandeering of state executive officials to violate principles of state sovereignty); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999)
(holding Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act to be beyond
Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 120
S. Ct. 631, 637 (2000) (ruling that states cannot be sued under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000)
(striking down the civil provision of the Violence Against Women Act as a noneconomic use
of the commerce power).
112 See supra note 109.
113 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
114 For federalist readings of Lopez, see generally Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of
Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten
Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 615 (1995); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in
Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1999); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795 (1996); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause:
Congressional Power to Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206 (1998);
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of
the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819
(1999); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); John C. Yoo,
Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990's, 32 IND. L. REV. 27 (1998).
115 U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people"). See also Maloney, supra note 98, at 1802.
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the Commerce Clause is not (or will not become) a grant of unlimited
power."' 16  Were it to become unlimited, no powers would be
reserved to the states and "the Tenth Amendment [would be] without
meaning."' 17
In this light, Lopez can be seen as an act of the Court to "[limit]
federal power in the name of state autonomy,""'8 and protect the
states from the congressional drive to "expand the body of federal
criminal law and enlarge the role of a national police power."''
Lopez can be seen as a federalist block by the Court against further
congressional usurpation of state criminal authority.' 0 But then the
questions remain: Why in Lopez (and its progeny) would the Court
choose to focus its attention on federal criminal laws? Why would
the court target predominately criminal acts for violating the rules of
federalism? 2'
Beyond the fact that "criminal law enforcement" is an area in
which the "[s]tates historically have been sovereign," the most
plausible answer to these questions is the aforementioned rapid
federalization of criminal law.'22 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has
indicated, the crisis created by case overload in the federal judiciary
all but demanded the sort of congressional curtailment afforded by
Lopez.123 Moreover, "because there are few interest groups to derail
feel-good, do-something federal crime bills, the Court may [have]
sense[d] that it alone [was] left to confront Congress" through the
116 Maloney, supra note 98, at 1802 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549). See also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 36 (1980).
117 Maloney, supra note 98, at 1802.
118 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT.
REV. 125, 130 (Lopez "limits an otherwise apparently unlimited grant of governmental power
in the name of a framing conception of autonomy").
'9 See Brickey, supra note 78, at 1136. See also Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and
the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 842-43 (1996)
(examining Lopez through the lens of federalism).
120 See Brickey, supra note 78, at 1136.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (gun possession law); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (gun control act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act).
122 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. See also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
123 See MCLEESE, supra note 58, at § 1.11 (citing NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 1 (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1996). See also
Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1030, 1037
(1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1999)




"institutional equilibrium" of a federalistic jurisprudence.'24 In effect,
the Court was all but forced to focus its newfound federalism on
criminal law, if for no other reason than the conflict between the
rapid expansion of federal criminal law and the idea that
"'[e]xpanding, unreviewed federal power, when no strong case can
be made for its existence', is contrary to the historic American
wisdom."'25
Unfortunately for the judiciary, despite Lopez and its progeny,
the drive to federalize crimes continues.'26 And though Lopez has
been used to challenge many of these federal criminal laws, "to date,
[Lopez] has been of assistance to few defendants."'27 In fact, as of
the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal
statutes, only three had been upheld. 2
One explanation for this weak showing might be the lack of
"agreement among the conservative Justices on the theoretical basis
114 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term
Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 71 (1994). See also Symposium.
Reflection on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 533-831 (1995).
125 Maroney, supra note 59, at 1339 (quoting TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR Assoc., supra note 59, at 27 (1998)). See also Stuart
Taylors, Jr., Looking Right at the Justices, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 1995, at 37, 38 ("Lopez might
be a useful corrective to the tendency of Congress casually to assume that it can do anything
it wants.").
126 Critics claim that the two interrelated reasons for the feverish federalization of
criminal law are politics and the media. That is, because politicians do not wish to appear
soft on crime, and know that their records will be publicized during elections, they all strive
to pass criminal legislation. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 59, at 1331 (quoting TASK FORCE
ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., supra note 59, at 14-15).
127 MCLEESE, supra note 58, at § 1.10. See also Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 923 (2000) ("Lopez's practical effect on existing criminal law has been
less than radical. In the years since Lopez was decided, few federal criminal statutes have
escaped Commerce Clause challenges, but almost all of these challenges have been
unsuccessful.").
128 William Funk, The Lopez Report, 23 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 1, 14 (1998). The three
successful challenges have all been against criminal statutes. See United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995) (residential building using natural gas from
interstate source did not satisfy jurisdictional requirement under the federal arson statute of
being involved in any activity affecting interstate commerce); United States v. Denalli, 73
F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996) (home in which work memos were written for international
business did not satisfy jurisdictional requirement under the federal arson statute of being
involved in any activity involving interstate commerce); United States v. Wilson, 133 F. 3d
251 (4th Cir. 1997) (though doubtful of Congress's power under Commerce Clause to
regulate polluted waters in question, court interpreted Clean Water Act to avoid the
Constitutional issue). Note, however, that "[o]f the 40-some laws that have been upheld
against a Lopez challenge, nine have been sustained over a dissent." Funk, supra, at 15.
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for enhancing state power." '129 After all, if the underlying foundation
for the current Court's federalist agenda remains murky, putting the
agenda to work can be an impossible task.13° Alternatively, the
unexpected impotency of Lopez can be explained by looking at the
case as "one item in [a] transformation process," a necessary first step
that over time will yield a body of federal criminal law that is bound
tight in the cloak of federalism.11  Given the continued attention to
Lopez, as well as the Court's persistence in returning to its federalist
theme, this second theory would seem to have merit, suggesting
that-far from being a dead letter or false start-Lopez will only
continue to grow in jurisprudential significance.
2. Illuminating the Legacy of Lopez: Jones v. United States
While the significance and historical position of Lopez is still
being decided, the Court in Jones v. United States showed that the
holding of Lopez-that Lopez itself-could be both pragmatically
and easily applied.' In Jones, the Court considered whether the
federal arson statute' 33-itself premised on some interstate activity-
could be used to reach the intrastate arson of a private residence and,
if it could, if its application to the private residence in question would
be constitutional. 1
34
With Lopez in mind, the Court found it appropriate "to avoid the
constitutional question that would arise were the Court to read [the
arson statute] to render the traditionally local criminal conduct in
which [the defendant] engaged a matter for federal enforcement.
'135
In other words, "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional question arise and
by the other of which such questions are avoided, the Court's duty is
to adopt the latter.' 36 In this case, the Court could either understand
the statute to reach traditionally intrastate arson-and thereby refute
Lopez and the most basic tenets of federalism-or it could, "before
129 Byron Dailey, The Five Faces of Federalism: A State-Power Quintet Without a
Theory, 62 OHmO ST. L.J. 1243, 1244 (2001).
130 Id.
31 Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 845, 850 (1996).
13' 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
133 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
14 529 U.S. at 851-52.
13 Id. at 850 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
136 Id. at 857 (citing United States ex. rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
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[choosing] the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite."'37 The Jones
Court chose the latter, refusing to recognize federal jurisdiction and
leaving the matter to Congress to resolve if necessary.'
Supported by Lopez in spirit, the Court in Jones was further
supported in letter by United States v. Bass.'3 9 The Court in Bass,
which sought to resolve ambiguous language under Title VII of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, faced a
dilemma similar to both Jones and Wills: how to interpret ambiguous
and potentially unconstitutional legislative language granting federal
criminal jurisdiction. 4° Like Jones, the Court in* Bass chose to
construe the statute narrowly, holding, as cited in Jones,'' that
"unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to
have significantly changed the federal-state balance" in the
prosecution of crimes.'42 For this reason, wrote Justice Stevens in his
concurrence to Jones, the Court "should interpret narrowly federal
criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless Congressional
intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain.'
'f 43
As the next section of this article will explain, Justice Stevens'
mandate, like the majority decision in Jones, is particularly
applicable to the situation in Wills. As in Jones, the Wills Court was
faced with a statute that had two possible interpretations: one that
would raise the serious constitutional issue of allowing federal
jurisdiction over an intrastate crime and another that would avoid the
constitutional issue and maintain the traditional balance of state and
' Id. at 858 (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1952)).
138 Id.
139 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
.4o Id. at 338.
141 United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 846, 850 (2000).
142 Bass, 404 U.S. at 349.
143 Jones, 529 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J., concurring). The ABA has echoed a similar
caution against over-federalizing criminal law:
To create a federal crime, a strong federal interest in the matter should be clearly shown, that is,
a distinctly federal interest beyond the mere conclusion that the conduct should be made criminal
by some appropriate governmental entity. Federal law enforcement for criminal activity that is
essentially local in character generally should not be undertaken, at least not without clearly
considered Congressional articulation of principles which has so far been absent. The near
unanimity of concern and agreement among those who have studied the problem should be a
powerful danger signal to the public, to the press, and to legislators.
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 59.
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federal power.'44 Unlike in Jones, however, the Wills court chose the
controversial outcome; it chose to extend federal jurisdiction where
Congress had not "convey[ed] its purpose clearly" or made its
"intention to assert its jurisdiction. . . plain."'45 Though the Wills
court felt that Congress had, in fact, conveyed its purpose clearly,
1 46
the conflicting outcome of Mclnnis showed this not to be the case,'47
and thereby begs the question: if not the 'clear purpose' of Congress,
on what grounds did the Wills court justify its expansive, contrarian
interpretation of the Federal Kidnapping Act?
48
III. A JUSTIFICATION FOR WILLS?
Amazingly, despite the dubious constitutionality of federal
criminal laws that regulate wholly intrastate activities,49 despite the
still unsettled position of Lopez,' and despite the current Court's
attempts to reestablish the limits of federalism,'51 the Wills court
nonetheless chose to extend the Federal Kidnapping Act to cover a
kidnapping that began and ended in one state.'52 To do so, the court
refuted the declared legislative intent of the Act (as well as the
general logic of the federal criminal regime in which it sits), refuted
precedent, and, in an extremely unnatural "natural reading of the
plain text," refuted even the text of the Act itself. In the upcoming
sections, the mistakes of the Wills court will be examined
individually, beginning with the manner by which the Wills court
refuted the declared legislative purpose behind the Act.
A. WILLS: REFUTING THE FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT
1. Purpose of the Act Itself
As explained earlier,'53 the original legislative purpose of the
Federal Kidnapping Act was to enable federal authorities to chase
144 See United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2000), cerl. denied, 533 U.S.
953 (2001); Jones, 529 U.S. at 850.
145 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Jones, 529 U.S. at 860.
146 Wills, 234 F.3d at 177.
147 United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1321 (5th Cir. 1979).
148 Wills, 234 F.3d at 177.
149 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
150 See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
151 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
152 See discussion supra Part I.A.
153 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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kidnappers when they fled from one jurisdiction to another,
something that the multitude of individual state statutes had
previously made difficult. 54 To achieve this end, Congress used
"comprehensive language" that covered "every possible variety of
kidnapping followed by interstate transportation," thereby giving
federal authorities broad power to disregard borders and prosecute
interstate kidnappings that individual states' laws could no longer
reach. "55
At the same time, the precise litany of crimes forbidden by the
Act-whoever "unlawfully seize[s], confine[s], inveigle[s], decoy[s],
kidnap[s], abduct[s]"-reveals that Congress was also using
"comprehensive language" to indicate by omission those criminal
acts that the Act did not cover, those "unattractive or immoral
situations lacking the involuntariness of seizure and detention which
is the very essence of the crime of kidnapping." '56 Congress was not
creating a catch-all, a general prosecutorial power by which federal
authorities could run roughshod over states' police power; there is no
indication that "Congress desired or contemplated [that the Act] ...
might be applied to those guilty of immoralities lacking the
characteristics of true kidnappings.""15
Nevertheless, the Wills court understood Congress's
"comprehensive language" to allow exactly the opposite, to allow
Christopher Wills to be convicted for a crime that-with regard to
travel in interstate commerce--displayed none of the "characteristics
of [a] true kidnappin[g]." 5 ' In doing so, the Wills court admitted that
the Act "demanded an inquiry into "whether the kidnapper ha[d]
interfered with, and exercised control over, the victim's actions."'
' 59
Likewise, the court acknowledged that "the involuntariness of seizure
and detention" was a required element of any kidnapping. 6 ° But
despite these statements and their seeming allegiance to the Act's
original intent, the Wills court went on to hold that luring Alam
across state lines through the guise of a phony job offer was sufficient
"control over" him to make his travel "involuntary" and therefore
154 See United States v. Chatwin, 326 U.S. 455, 463 (1946).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 457, 464.
157 id.
158 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2000).
159 Id. at 178 (citing United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 1994)); see
also Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 464.
160 Wills, 234 F. 3d at 178 (citing United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir.
1994)); see also Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 464.
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spring jurisdiction under the Act.161 That Alam could have "seen
through the plan or could have decided not to explore the job [offer]
ha[d] no significance" under the Act; by enticing Alam to travel, the
court held, Wills "willfully caused unaccompanied travel over state
lines" and therefore "'willfully transported' Alam within the meaning
of the statute.'
162
But how can one "exercise control over" another person who is
traveling voluntarily? And how can enticing voluntary travel be said
to satisfy the "involuntariness of seizure and detention" that must be
part of any kidnapping? On these points the Wills court was cryptic;
it held only that "Wills' actions in securing the cell phone in
Washington, D.C., arranging the interview in Washington, D.C., and
placing the [phony job] flier at Alam's home in Virginia support[ed]
a finding that Alam was 'willfully transported' within the meaning of
the statute."'
' 63
As for why it would choose to enforce an Act prohibiting
"kidnapping[s] followed by interstate transportation" against a
defendant who, at most, committed a wholly intrastate kidnapping act
after enticing his victim to cross state lines voluntarily, the Wills
court again spoke in vagaries. 64  A 1972 amendment to the
Kidnapping Act,'65 the court explained, had reduced interstate
transport of the victim from an integral part of the crime to "merely a
basis for federal jurisdiction."'' 6 6 The effect of this change, it further
explained, was to make "the thrust of the offense the kidnapping
itself rather than the interstate transportation of the kidnapped
person.' 67  And because of this new "thrust," the Wills court
reasoned, it could therefore claim jurisdiction over a kidnapping that
161 Wills, 234 F.3d at 178-79.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 176.
165 Instead of the original Act's single basis for federal jurisdiction in the interstate or
foreign transport of a kidnappee, the amended Act also grants jurisdiction when the
kidnapping occurs within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., within
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S., or when the victim involved is a foreign official,
internationally-protected person, or official guest of the U.S. government. 18 U.S.C.A. §
1201 (West 2001).
166 Wills, 234 F.3d at 176 (quoting United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 242 (4th Cir.
1994) (Widener, J., concurring)).
167 Id. Legislative history explains that this change was made in the aftermath of the
1972 Munich Olympics "to remedy defects in the traditional interstate transportation
jurisdiction as applied to international terrorism or hijacking situations." United States v.
Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 1994); see also S. REP. No. 92-1105, at 4317 (1972).
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involved voluntary interstate travel before the "kidnapping" had even
occurred." 8
Unfortunately, the reasoning of Wills will not survive even the
language of the amended Act. 169 For though the rewritten Act did
shift the "thrust of the offense" in the manner the Wills court
describes, 7' it did not discount the "interstate transport of the
[already] kidnapped person" nor excise the jurisdictional requirement
of the "interstate transportation of the victim."'' In other words,
though the amendment expanded the Act's jurisdictional base, it did
nothing to "alter the established requirement that the criminal activity
precede the interstate movement."'7 2
Perhaps, to extend the logic of Wills, it could be concluded that
the "criminal activity" that must precede the interstate movement
could include the sort of "inveiglement" or "decoy" that Wills used to
lure Alam across state lines.'73 Such a conclusion, however, would
violate not only the original intent of the Act-to police "every
possible variety of kidnapping followed by interstate
transportation"-but would also, as we will see in the next section,
violate the general legislative logic of the federal criminal regime."'
2. The Federal Criminal Legislative Regime
Viewing the Federal Kidnapping Act in the context of the
complete federal criminal regime puts the error of the Wills decision
68 Wills, 234 F.3d at 176.
169 See supra note 24.
170 The amendment does omit language that once explicitly required the kidnapping
precede the transport of the victim in interstate travel. See id.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
172 Hughes, 716 F.2d at 238; see also S. REP. No. 92-1105 at 4317 (1972) (despite the
expanded jurisdiction afforded under the amendment to the Act, "the prime responsibility to
investigate, prosecute and punish common law crimes such as murder, kidnapping and
assault should remain in the several States.").
173 Previously, the "decoy" and "inveiglement" mentioned in the Act have been
addressed only as means by which a kidnapper convinces a victim to accompany him. See,
e.g., United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1997) (victim was inveigled into
accompanying kidnapper); United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1982).
174 United States v. Chatwin, 326 U.S. 455,463 (1946); see also Hughes, 716 F.2d at 238
(the policy of the Act is violated when the Act is employed against a defendant "simply
because during some relevant time period prior to the kidnapping the eventual offender and
his victim crossed a state line." In such a scenario there is "no attempt to escape the
jurisdiction in which the offense occurred" and therefore no justification for "departing from




in specific relief'75 For despite the Wills court's belief that a victim's
voluntary-though fraudulently induced-travel across state lines
can invoke jurisdiction under the Act, no other federal criminal Act is
likewise understood to afford such a broad concept of federal
jurisdiction.'76 Quite simply, "the kidnapping statute thus fits into a
common statutory model for federal offenses that premise federal
jurisdiction on the offender's unlawful exercise of control over a
person or object followed by the interstate transportation of that
person or object." '
Of course, as the McInnis court documents, there are many
federal criminal laws under which defendants can be prosecuted for
causing interstate transport without actually doing the transporting
themselves."7 ' And on the surface, this would seem to support Wills'
finding that because "Wills willfully caused unaccompanied travel
over state lines [it was] sufficient to confer jurisdiction."17 9  The
distinction between the two points of view, however, lies in their
understanding of the word "cause." In most judicial decisions
rendered under federal criminal law, "causing" unaccompanied travel
first involves "some significant and unlawful step" taken towards the
commission of a federal crime, a step that "exercise[s] control over a
person or object" before then using some other "instrumentality" to
175 See United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (5th Cir. 1979).
176 Two partial exceptions are the federal racketeering statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 2312, 2314),
which premises jurisdiction on the use of interstate facilities to further certain criminal
activities, and the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2423), which grants federal jurisdiction
over a defendant who "knowingly transports" a prostitute across state lines. See infra note
177.
177 Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1326; see also NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW CRIMINAL CODE 14 (1970).
178 See, e.g., United States v. Pererira, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (National Stolen Property
Act allows jurisdiction when defendant cashes out-of-state check, thereby causing the check
to be transported in interstate commerce); United States v. Levine, 457 F.2d 1186, 1188
(10th Cir. 1972) (18 U.S.C. § 1952 jurisdiction attached when prison inmates caused others
to ship narcotics in interstate commerce); United States v Leggett, 269 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.
1959) (jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 2312-a prohibition against the interstate shipment of
stolen cars-attaches where defendant induced car salesman to drive a stolen car across state
lines). In contrast, under the Mann Act, a defendant who "knowingly transports" a prostitute
across state lines invokes the federal jurisdiction of the Act, though "knowingly transports"
does not extend to "causing" the transportation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 and 2423(a) (1998);
United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2000). This is because § 3 of the Mann
Act explicitly creates a separate jurisdictional basis for interstate transport when a party is
induced and therefore caused to cross state lines on her own accord. See Graham v. United
States, 154 F.2d 325, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
179 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 179, cert.denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
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complete the transport out of state.18° This point of view, obviously,
informs the policy behind the Federal Kidnapping Act. 8 '
For the Wills court, though, "cause" had a far different meaning;
there, a defendant "causes" unaccompanied travel when he
establishes conditions that will entice or facilitate another to move
himself across state lines. 8 2  With Wills, there is no prerequisite
control to be followed by the use of an instrumentality, nor is there
the need for an initial unlawful step; with Wills, a simple invitation-
fraudulent or not-would be sufficient "cause" and "control" to show
that a defendant had transported his victim across state lines.'83
We should note that, when a victim is made to involuntarily
travel alone through the force of the defendant's threats, the courts
have generally agreed to a Wills-like expansion of federal
jurisdiction.'84 That is, because "transportation brought about as a
result of the defendant's threats [is] in effect accomplished by the
defendant," that transportation cannot be deemed voluntary due to the
control being utilized by the defendant."8 ' Unlike the situation in
Wills, the threatening defendant does in fact "cause" his victim's
unaccompanied travel, in that he takes an immediate unlawful step-
the threat-to exercise control over the victim, and then uses an
instrumentality-the controlled victim himself-to complete the
transport in interstate commerce." 6 And unlike Alam in Wills,
because the victim under this "threat" theory is not free to turn back,
his individual travel can be said to have been "caused" by the acts of
the defendant.' 87 As a result, while federal criminal law does likely
afford for jurisdiction when a victim is forced-by threats-to travel
alone, such jurisdiction cannot be extended to the situation in Wills.
In Wills there was no threat that caused Alam to travel, and without
180 Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1325-26.
181 See discussion supra at Part IA; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text..
182 Wills, 234 F.3d at 178.
183 Id.
184 See Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1326 (citing Bearden v. United States, 304 F.2d 532 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
185 Id. See also United States. v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (voluntarily
accompanying a kidnapper across state lines does satisfy interstate transport requirements
because kidnapper's "force in reserve" ensures that any attempt to end the journey will
immediately spring the kidnapper's unlawful intent). These two variations on the interstate
transport requirement are similar in that they both account for a loss of the victim's free will
to travel or not; that is, in both cases, should the victim decide to abandon his trip, the
kidnapper's force or threat exists as the control that would overcome such a decision.




the threat there can be no control.' 8 Without control there can be no
causation, and without causation there has been no interstate
transport.
8 9
In sum, by recognizing federal jurisdiction in the absence of
"transport" and "cause," Wills contradicts not only the policy behind
the Kidnapping Act, but also the general logic of the federal criminal
regime. The case is, in a word, an anomaly. To further pursue this
view and continue the argument against Wills, the next section will
show how Wills is also anomalous within the context of the
Kidnapping Act jurisprudence. The final section will examine the
text of the Kidnapping Act itself and the means by which the Wills
court uses the Act to justify its outsider and unconstitutional
understanding of federal jurisdiction.
B. WILLS: REFUTING THE PRECEDENT
Wills, like most other cases under the Act concerned with "the
scope of jurisdiction for kidnappings accomplished through deceit,"
was focused primarily on whether the victim had been "inveigled" or
"decoyed."'' 90  In line with precedent, Wills recognized that
kidnappings by inveiglement and decoy were punishable under the
Act.' 9' Beyond precedent, however, Wills then went on to hold that
decoy or inveiglement alone, without the kidnapper's control-
without his accompaniment.92  or "force in reserve"' 93-- ould
sufficiently cause a victim's interstate travel and therefore invoke the
jurisdiction of the Act. 94
The Wills court acknowledged that, because "many, even most, §
1201 kidnapping victims [were] typically accompanied across state
lines by their kidnappers," McInnis had been the courts' only
previous opportunity to explicitly consider a victim's voluntary travel
"' Wills, 234 F.3d at 175-76.
189 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
190 Wills, 234 F.3d at 177. See e.g., United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir.
1994); United States v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565, 1576 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1982). For clarity's sake, Hoog defines "inveigle" as "to
lure or lead astray by false representations or promises, or other deceitful means" and
"decoy" as "enticement or luring by means of some fraud, trick, or temptation." United
States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 51 (8th Cir. 1994).
191 Wills, 234 F.3d at 176; see also supra note 186.
192 See Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1326.
193 See United States. v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555-56 (11 th Cir. 1992).
194 Wills, 234 F.3d at 178.
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across state lines (as a result of decoy or inveiglement).'95 As
discussed previously, Wills chose to disagree with the decision
Mclnnis reached.'96 But Wills also chose to ignore the remainder of
cases dealing with decoy and inveiglement, finding that their explicit
silence on the point of accompaniment equaled an absence of input.'97
In other words, Wills found that-because accompaniment or threats
had occurred in all other previous cases, and because those cases
therefore had no cause to require that accompaniment be
"obligatory"-previous caselaw had no bearing on the "question of
whether accompaniment is necessary for the Act to apply."' 98
An examination of the case law preceding Wills reveals this
conclusion to be misguided. To begin with, cases predicating
jurisdiction on "decoy" and "inveiglement" under the Act inevitably
recognize that control-usually in the form of kidnapper's
presence-must either be an apparent or reserved element of
deception. "'
For example, in United States v. Hughes, a kidnapper tricked his
victim into voluntarily accompanying him across state lines before
making his ill will apparent."' The court held that, because
jurisdiction under the Act required a kidnapping to occur "prior to...
interstate transportation," "inveiglement" and "decoy" under the Act
must also include "inducing a victim by misrepresentation to...
195 Id. See also Mclnnis, 601 F.2d at 1326.
196 See supra Part I.C.
117 Wills, 234 F.3d at 177-78 ("Contrary to the district court's and [the defendant's]
assumption," the fact that in every case but Mclnnis the victim had been accompanied across
state lines "does not directly address the legal question of whether accompaniment is
necessary to the Act to apply.").
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The very nature
of the crime of kidnapping requires that the kidnapper use some means of force-actual or
threatened, physical or mental-in each elemental stage of the crime, so that the victim is
taken, held and transported against his or her will"); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 51
(8th Cir. 1994) (though defendant did not himself accompany victim across state lines, his
decoy and inveiglement caused the victim to cross state lines in the company of an
accomplice); United States. v. Boone, 959 F.2d 1550, 1555 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (force held in
reserve by defendant during otherwise innocent and voluntary state-line crossing satisfies
requirements of decoy and inveiglement); Miller v. United States, 138 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.
1943) (kidnapper deceiving his victim to cross state lines with him on the premise that her
grandfather was on his deathbed was sufficient force to show inveiglement preceded
accompaniment across state lines); and United States. v. Stands, 105 F.3d 1565 (8th Cir.
1997) (victim was inveigled when deceived into joining group that would later kidnap and
beat him).
200 United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 236-38 (4th Cir. 1994).
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accompany" the kidnapper across state lines.2' That the victim goes
voluntarily is irrelevant; because the kidnapper "has interfered with,
and exercised control over" the victim before crossing state lines, the
kidnapping has occurred prior to crossing state lines, and therefore
jurisdiction is appropriate." 2
Under Hughes, "inveiglement" and "decoy" do not mean 'to
induce the victim to travel across state lines on his own accord';
rather, they mean 'to deceive the victim into joining the kidnapper in
a trip across state lines.'20 3 The former, as Hughes illustrates, is an
"innocent" state line crossing-perhaps another law has been
violated, but a kidnapping (under the Act) has not yet begun.0 4
"Inveiglement" and "decoy," in contrast, demand some level of
accompaniment or other control during interstate transport.0 5 To
hold otherwise, the Hughes court recognized, would be to assume a
"difference on policy grounds between a purely local kidnapping and
one preceded by an otherwise innocent state line crossing."2 6
This logic gained support in United States v. Jackson.2 7 There,
the Fifth Circuit held that to establish "inveiglement" or "decoy"
under the Act, prosecutors need not "prove that the defendant
personally moved the victim in interstate commerce," but that the
victim "was transported in interstate commerce," presumably, as in
that case, by an accomplice.08 Jackson differs slightly from Hughes
in that it affords for the work of an accomplice (instead of the
defendant himself), but it nevertheless buttresses Hughes' view that
"inveiglement" and "decoy" involve some level of control-be it by
the kidnapper or an accomplice-attending the victim as she crosses
state lines.20 9 The government must establish that the victim was
transported, Jackson holds, not that the victim transported himself as
a result of another's deception. 10
20 Id. at 237, 239.
202 Id. at 239 (noting that such conduct is "sufficient to satisfy the 'involuntariness of
seizure and detention' requirement of Chatwin").
203 Id. at 237-39.
204 id.
205 id.
206 Id. at 239.
207 978 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1992).
208 Id. at 910. See also United States v. Barksdale-Conteras, 972 F.2d I II (5th Cir.
1992) (defendants convicted under Federal Kidnapping Act after jurisdictional element was
satisfied by the victim being transported in interstate commerce by accomplices).
209 See infra Part III.C.
210 Jackson, 978 F.2d at 910.
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Again, the idea that "decoy" and "inveigle" require some level of
control (during the transport of the victim) was further extended and
supported by United States v Boone.21' In Boone, the court
considered whether a victim deceived into crossing state lines before
being murdered was "inveigled" under the Act.212 To determine if a
victim has been "inveigled," the court held, "a fact finder must
ascertain whether the alleged kidnapper had the willingness and
intent to use physical or psychological force to complete the
kidnapping in the event that his deception failed." ' In other words,
a kidnapper need not physically hold his victim as they cross state
lines, but he must be capable of exercising some form of control-
must retain some "force in reserve"--for jurisdiction to attach.21 4 For
the Boone court, "inveiglement" satisfies this test when the kidnapper
"interferes with his victim's actions, exercising control over his
victim through the willingness to use forcible action" should the
victim try to reverse their travel." 5  For the Boone court,
"inveiglement" necessarily requires the defendant's "force in
reserve," the defendant's accompaniment, when state lines are
crossed.21 6
In sum, as the Supreme Court explains in Chatwin v. United
States: "[t]he act of holding a kidnapped person for a proscribed
purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental restraint
for an appreciable period against the person's will and with a willful
intent so to confine the victim. ' '2 11 Without "an act of unlawful
restraint," a kidnapping cannot occur. 8 As a result, to inveigle or
decoy a victim across state lines, there must be "restraint," there must
be some level of control and there must be either accompaniment or a
threat.219
211 959 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1992).
212 Id. at 1554-55.
213 Id. at 1555.
214 Id. at 1555-56 ("Here, Boone inveigled [his victim] into driving [across state lines]
and accompanied him on that journey... [a]t all times... remain[ing] in a position where
he could use force to ensure the kidnapping and transporting of [the victim] to the remote
site" where the crime would take place").
215 Id. at 1555 n.5.
216 Id. at 1555-56.
217 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946).
218 Id.
219 Id. See also United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 546 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (if the
victim is not being held against her will, there is no kidnapping, and therefore interstate
travel does not further the commission of a crime); United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d
985, 990 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[t]o establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l), the
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C. WILLS: A NATURAL MISREADING OF THE FULL TEXT
With little fanfare, the Wills court chose to "respectfully
disagree" with this well-established precedent (and ignore the policy
behind the Act) in order to decide its case by making a "natural
reading of the full text."22 Before doing so, the court cited the Act
itself: "Whoever unlawfully ... inveigles, [or] decoys ... and holds
for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, . .. when the person
is willfully transported in interstate ... commerce ... [shall be
punished] ."221
It then came to a simple conclusion: the plain language of the
Act does not require that the defendant accompany, physically
transport, or provide for the physical transportation of the victim.
Rather, the Act only requires that the victim "is willfully
transported." If Congress wished to make accompaniment by the
defendant over state lines a requirement under the Act, it could easily
have written the Act to provide for it.222 In this way the Wills court
dismissed nearly seventy years of well-established precedent and
policy.223
But how surprising that the court should choose to do so by
employing such a willfully limited understanding of English syntax.
No, as the court concludes, the Act does not explicitly require-as it
did in its original 1932 iteration-the defendant to willfully transport
the victim across state lines.224 The Act does, however, demand that
the victim "[be] willfully transported." Though the court chose to
ignore it, this is a demand made in the passive voice, a means of
grammatical construction in which an "object-verb-subject [sentence]
sequence" is used if "the object of the sentence is more important
than the actor, or if the actor [in the sentence] is obvious. 225  In
choosing to employ the passive voice, as Congress did in the Act, an
author need "not . . . include [an] actor to have a grammatical
government must prove ... that the defendant 1) knowingly and willfully kidnapped the
victim; 2) held him for ransom, reward, or other benefit; and 3) transported him in interstate
commerce"). But see United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1466-68 (10th Cir. 1993)
(though "the interstate aspect of the statute ... requires that a state line be crossed while the
crime is in progress," the court nonetheless reserves judgment on "whether inveigling or
decoying the victim across state lines for subsequent abduction violates" the Act).
220 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000).
221 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
222 id.
223 See supra Part Il.1B.
224 See supra note 24.
225 HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 172 (4th ed. 1999).
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sentence," though he will "risk obscuring the narrative if [he] end[s]
the sentence without identifying the actor. 2 26 In sum, even when
obscured by the passive voice, the actor in a sentence, the person
causing the action, still exists.
22 1
Thus informed, we can see that to say either "an actor willfully
transported his victim" or "the victim was willfully transported" is to
say the same thing, provided that, in the second example, the actor in
the sentence is identified elsewhere. In the Federal Kidnapping Act,
the actor in the sentence is identified as "whoever unlawfully
inveigles or decoys., 2 8 Therefore, when the Act later requires that
the victim "is willfully transported," the "transporter"-the actor
doing the transporting-must still be "whoever unlawfully inveigles
or decoys."
Though the Wills court chose not to do so, it could have argued
that "is willfully transported" refers to a third party, to someone else
who willfully transports the victim. Such an argument would fail,
however, when we consider that there are only two parties mentioned
by the Act: "whoever unlawfully inveigles or decoys" and the
"person" being inveigled or decoyed.229 If the passive voice only
subverts but does not eliminate the actor, then the name of the actor
must be somewhere in the Act, as well. 30 Can we not assume that
Congress attached the substantive elements of the crime to specific
actors named within the Act itself?
2 1
In the alternative, if we ignore the Act's identification of
"whoever unlawfully inveigles or decoys" as the actor in the sentence
and allow that "is willfully transported" might be referring to some
other actor, some "transporter" other than the kidnapper himself232-
an allowance that would, in fact, alleviate an accompaniment
226 Id.
227 See generally, JOSEPH M. WILLIAMS, STYLE: TEN LESSONS IN CLARITY & GRACE 64-72
(4th ed. 1994) (explaining the implied role of an actor in the passive construction); TEXAS
LAW REVIEW, MANUAL ON USAGE AND STYLE 3-4 (Texas Law Review ed., 8th ed. 1995)
(discussing how "the passive form needlessly conceals the identity of the actor").
228 See supra note 24.
229 See supra note 24.
230 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
231 Can we not assume that Congress-in its 1972 amendment to the Act, the amendment
that created the "is willfully transported" confusion-intended to maintain the Act's original
purpose and effect, or would have otherwise explicitly said so?
232 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 910 (5th Cir. 1992) (co-conspirator,
not kidnapper himself, moved victim across state lines); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45,




requirement for the kidnapper himself-the holding of Wills would
nevertheless continue to fail because there would still need to be that
other "transporter." In other words, even if the kidnapper need not
"transport" the victim under the Act, a grammatically informed
reading of the text reveals that someone, some actor, some other
person must "willfully transport" the victim across state lines for
jurisdiction under the Act to attach. 3
The Wills court believed that Wills' actions in deceiving Alam
"support[ed] [such a] finding that Alam was 'willfully transported'
within the meaning of the statute., 234 But how? There was no act of
"transport" on Wills' or anyone else's part, provided that a "natural
reading of the full text" continues to understand the word "transport"
to mean "to carry from one place to another; convey., 235 No one-
other than Alam himself-carried him anywhere; no one conveyed
him across state lines.236 To think otherwise, as the Wills court did,
would cause the Act to read (in the active voice): "when the victim
willfully transports himself in interstate or foreign commerce." Such
a reading refutes both legislative intent and reason. 37
The key to understanding the Wills court's contrarian perception
of the Act lies in the last sentence of its opinion.2 38 There, where one
might expect the court to have found that because Wills had willfully
transported Alam over state lines-because Wills had kidnapped
Alam over state lines-it would therefore recognize jurisdiction
under the Act; the court instead found that because "Wills [had]
willfully caused [Alam's] unaccompanied travel over state lines [it
was] sufficient to confer jurisdiction" under the Act. 39  In other
words, the court admitted that in order to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of the Act, it was not looking for the active transport of a
kidnapping victim across jurisdictional lines, but was instead looking
for the cause of a victim's pre-kidnapping state-line crossing.24 As
discussed previously,24 I this construction cannot survive: the
Kidnapping Act, like the remainder of our federal criminal
233 See supra note 24.
234 United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 179, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
235 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1903 (3d ed. 1992).
236 Wills, 234 F.3d at 175-76.
237 See supra Parts I.A. and III.A. 1.
231 Wills, 234 F.3d at 179.
239 Id.
240 id.
241 See supra Part III.A.2.
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legislation, "premise[s] federal jurisdiction on the offender's
unlawful exercise of control over a person or object followed by the
interstate transportation of that person or object. '24 2 Because pre-
kidnapping travel occurs previous to control, it cannot be said to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.243
In sum, the Wills court uses its "natural reading of the plain text"
to reach a conclusion refuted by the policy behind the Act, by the
precedent built thereon, and by even the text of the Act itself. In an
advisory brief to the Supreme Court, however, the solicitor general
seemed to downplay the error of Wills, stating that the nearly novel
issue of the case-unaccompanied interstate kidnappings-was so
rare as to be unworthy of certiorari.244 The Supreme Court agreed,
denying certiorari.245
V. CONCLUSION: THE LENTZ CASE AND THE FUTURE OF WILLS
Although the solicitor general convinced the Supreme Court that
unaccompanied interstate kidnappings are rare, because of Wills and
its drastic expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction under the Act,
the "rare" kidnapping occasion has already become a new
prosecutorial means for attaching jurisdiction where it would not
246otherwise exist. In particular, Virginia prosecutors have chosen to
revive the case of Doris Lentz, a Virginia resident whose
disappearance in 1996 was followed shortly by the discovery of her
blood-soaked car.247 Now, Jay Lentz, her former husband, faces the
death penalty, in part because the federal government can claim
jurisdiction under Wills by arguing that Lentz lured his wife to
voluntarily travel unaccompanied across state lines.248 With Wills in
effect, voluntary interstate travel is the means by which federal
authorities-using federal laws-can prosecute wholly intrastate
crimes that are otherwise "nearly impossible" for state law to
242 United States v. Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1326 (5th Cir. 1979).; see also supra Parts
I.A. and III.A.2.
243 See supra Part III.A.2.
244 Siobhan Roth, Crossing the Line to Nail Suspects. U.S. Prosecutors Bring Unusual
Capital Charges in Two Cases that Left a Trail Across the Region, 24 LEGAL TIMES, June 25,
2001, at 2.
245 Wills, 533 U.S. 953 (2001).
246 See Roth, supra note 244, at 2.
247 Ron Vample, Death Penalty Sought Against Man Accused of Killing Wife,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 31, 2001.
248 See Roth, supra note 244, at 2; Varnple, supra note 247.
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reach. 49 With Wills in effect, the Federal Kidnapping Act becomes a
grant of federal police power to govern kidnappings that begin and
end in one state."'
In support of this new regime, one of the prosecutors in Wills has
argued that despite the "criticism of prosecutors [for] overreaching
and of Congress for enacting criminal statutes that seem too broad
and step on the toes of the states .... you need some mechanism to fill
in the gaps in the state law."25 From the prosecutor's point of view,
the "gaps" Wills filled are more important than the toes stepped on;
the kidnappers to be prosecuted outweigh the minor federal intrusion
into the states.
As this article has explained, however, the prosecutor's argument
cannot stand. First and foremost, his argument fails when we
consider that the original legislative purpose of the Act was to
prosecute interstate kidnappings that individual state laws could not
reach.252 To prosecute intrastate kidnappings, as both the cited
prosecutor and Wills itself would have us do, would not constitute
filling a "gap" between state laws-the point and effect of the Act in
its inception.253 Instead, to grant federal power over intrastate crimes
would be more of an "overlap," a secondary layer of legislation that
brings federal authorities into the states as a secondary layer of police
enforcement.
Likewise, the prosecutor's argument must fail because, even if
the federal government recognizes a "gap" it wants to fill, in doing so
it is forbidden to step (even slightly) on the states' toes. 54 As
explained earlier, under the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause, Congress' ability to claim federal jurisdiction is founded on
the interstate effects of that which it would regulate. 5 Therefore,
249 See Roth, supra note 244, at 3. (One prosecutor admitted that, after Wills, he would
seek a federal prosecution for any "cases like Wills, where on a state level there is a venue
question that federally is not a problem").
250 When reconsidering the prosecution of Lentz, Arlington Commonwealth Attorney
Richard Trodden admitted that his office "had a discussion with the U.S. Attorney's Office,
and [they] decided that the [federal prosecutors] had a better chance." Roth, supra note 245,
at 3. After Wills, state attorneys general can turn to federal prosecutors to pursue wholly
intrastate cases that were coincidentally preceded by the victim's voluntary interstate travel.
In other words, after Wills, federal prosecutors can be called upon to prosecute intrastate
kidnappings that state attorneys general cannot-for whatever reason-successfully pursue.
251 Roth, supra note 245, at 3.
252 See supra Parts I.A. and III.A.I.
253 See supra Part I.A.
254 See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.I.
255 See supra Part II.B. I and III.A.2.
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when it acts to legislate, as it did when enacting the Federal
Kidnapping Act, Congress must necessarily act in between the states
themselves; it must necessarily not step on the states' toes and fill
only those interstate gaps that are outside an individual state's
reach.256
To read the Federal Kidnapping Act as the prosecutor would, as
Wills would-to see the Act as a grant of federal authority over
intrastate kidnappings preceded by the victim's voluntary interstate
travel-would be to do the very thing the Court warned against in
Lopez: it would be to "covert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the states." '257  Moreover, and more importantly, to read the
Kidnapping Act in this way would render it unconstitutional. 258 For
as this article has already explained, Congress has no general police
power-it cannot willingly invade the traditional province of the
states simply because it seeks to enforce a particular crime to a
degree that the states themselves do not.259 As a result, if the
Kidnapping Act does-as Wills allows-invade the states in this way,
if it does allow federal jurisdiction over intrastate crimes, then it also
violates the Tenth Amendment. To violate the Tenth Amendment is
more than to simply disrupt the balance of federalism-it is to violate
the constitution itself.
260
Of course, as this article has already explained, the current
Supreme Court would not likely find that the Federal Kidnapping Act
is, in fact, unconstitutional.261 Instead, as it did in Lopez and Jones,
the Court would likely read the legislation in question-the Federal
Kidnapping Act-in the most constitutionally favorable light.262 In
other words, the Court would not read the Act as a grant federal
jurisdiction over a historically state-controlled matter; it would not
"choose the harsher alternative" and allow Congress to police
intrastate criminal activity.263 Instead, with an eye to the limits of
federalism, the Court would most likely maintain the traditional
balance of power and the traditional limits to federal power that have
256 See supra Part IBI.1.
257 See supra Parts II.A.2 and I.B. 1.
258 See supra Part II.B.1.
259 See supra introduction to Parts II and II.A.
260 See supra Part lIBI.
261 See supra Part I.B.2.
262 See supra Parts II.A.2 and I.B.
263 See supra note 134.
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long existed under Kidnapping Act jurisprudence. 264 For as Jones
illustrates so well, the Court is today unwilling to grant new federal
authority on the basis of ambiguous statutory language.265 Therefore,
if Congress-following Wills-wants the Kidnapping Act to give
federal authorities an intrastate presence that they never-before
possessed, and if Congress wants to Act to enable federal authorities
to police kidnappings beginning and ending in one state, it will likely
have to restate the Act in language that cannot be so easily interpreted
to mean otherwise. 266 The Court has shown itself to be a federalist
watchdog: it is, at the least, prepared to require continued attempts at
federalization to be made explicitly.
264 See supra Part II.B.2.
261 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
266 See supra Part II.B.2.
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